Deleted:Salman Rabeii

Salman Yahya Hassan Mohammed Rabeii is a citizen of Yemen, currently held in extrajudicial detention in the United States Guantanamo Bay detainment camps, in Cuba. His Guantanamo Internment Serial Number is 508. The Department of Defense reported that Rabeii was born on June 30, 1979, in Jedda, Saudi Arabia.

Salman arrived at Guantanamo on May 1, 2002. He is still there.

Salman Rabeii is probably a brother of the late Fawaz al-Rabeiee alias Furqan al-Tajiki, to whom he sent a letter while in Afghanistan.

Salman Yahya Hasan Mohammed Al-Rabi'i (2002). "English transcripts of three declassified letters". Combatting Terrorism Center. p. 4. Archived from the original on 2006-03-04. http://web.archive.org/web/20060304150910/http://www.ctc.usma.edu/aq/AFGP-2002-001120-Trans.pdf. Retrieved 2013-04-26. "In the Name of God the Merciful the Compassionate

I felt alive again when I saw you, and felt my heart pulse when I spoke with you. I love you as the pure water, as the running river, and as the blooming spring roses. I love you in a way Qais and Laila did not feel; do you perhaps love me as I love you! <p>Signed: Salman Yahya Hasan Mohammed Al-Rabi’i"</span>  </ref>

Combatant Status Review Tribunal

Combatant Status Review Tribunals were held in a trailer the size of a large RV. The captive sat on a plastic garden chair, with his hands and feet shackled to a bolt in the floor. Three chairs were reserved for members of the press, but only 37 of the 574 Tribunals were observed.Template:POV-section

Initially the Bush administration asserted that they could withhold all the protections of the Geneva Conventions to captives from the war on terror. This policy was challenged before the Judicial branch. Critics argued that the USA could not evade its obligation to conduct a competent tribunals to determine whether captives are, or are not, entitled to the protections of prisoner of war status.

Subsequently the Department of Defense instituted the Combatant Status Review Tribunals. The Tribunals, however, were not authorized to determine whether the captives were lawful combatants -- rather they were merely empowered to make a recommendation as to whether the captive had previously been correctly determined to match the Bush administration's definition of an enemy combatant.

Rabeii chose to participate in his Combatant Status Review Tribunal. Rabeii didn't attend his Tribunal in person. But he dictated responses to the allegations for his Personal Representative to read to the Tribunal.

Allegations

The allegations against Rabeii were:

a. The detainee was associated with Al Qaida.

1. Detainee voluntarily traveled from Sanaa, Yemen to Afghanistan.
2. Detainee attended the Al Farouq training camp in August 2001.

b. The detainee participated in military operations against the coalition.

1. Detainee was captured with other members of his training squad from the Al Farouq training camp.
2. If released, detainee advised that he should be considered a threat to the United States.

Rabeii's response to the allegations

Rabeii told his Personal Representative he was not associated with al Qaeda. He acknowledged he was in Afghanistan, in August, but he denied that he attended the al Farouq training camp.

Rabeii denied he was captured with others. He told his Personal Representative that he voluntarily sought out Afghani authorities in Jalalabad, and surrendered himself, because he wanted help getting back to Yemen.

Rabeii totally denied that he had ever threatened the USA.

Dispute over the documents

In the Combatant Status Review Tribunals it is the Recorder's responsibility to act like a Prosecutor, and compile and distribute the allegations against the detainee. The Tribunal members were concerned that the wording of the allegations, as read out, differed from the wording in copies they had been given to read.

Administrative Review Board hearing

Detainees who were determined to have been properly classified as "enemy combatants" were scheduled to have their dossier reviewed at annual Administrative Review Board hearings. The Administrative Review Boards weren't authorized to review whether a detainee qualified for POW status, and they weren't authorized to review whether a detainee should have been classified as an "enemy combatant".

They were authorized to consider whether a detainee should continue to be detained by the United States, because they continued to pose a threat -- or whether they could safely be repatriated to the custody of their home country, or whether they could be set free.

The factors for and against continuing to detain Rabeil were among the 121 that the Department of Defense released on March 3 2006.

The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee voluntarily traveled from Sanaa, Yemen to Afghanistan.
2. The detainee was captured with other members of his training squad from the al Farouq training camp.

b. Training

1. The detainee attended the al Farouq training camp in August 2001.
2. The detainee attended the Malik training camp, commonly used for advanced military training.

c. Connection / Association

1. The detainee's name was found on a computer hard drive belong to a high level al Qaida operative listing captured mujahidin.
2. The detainee's name was found on a document listing 324 Arabic names, aliases, and nationalities recovered from safe house raids associated with suspected al Qaida in Karachi, Pakistan.

d. Intent

1. If released, the detainee advised that he should be considered a threat to the United States.
2. In 2002, the detainee described at length how much he hated America. He also threatened the interviewing agent with bodily harm.

The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

• "I am not associated with al Qaida."
• "I never attended any training at the al Farouq training camp in August. I was in Afghanistan, but not at that training camp."
• "I never said such a thing as I would harm or threaten the United States."
• The detainee noted that his motivation to travel revolved around his interest in earning money. He explained that he could make more money in handouts from al Qaida in Pakistan and Afghanistan than he could trying to earn an honest wage in his home country.
• The detainee intended to travel to Afghanistan and undergo training "for kicks", and then return to Yemen with whatever money he might save from "handouts".

References

External links

• Who Are the Remaining Prisoners in Guantánamo? Part Two: Captured in Afghanistan (2001) Andy Worthington, September 17, 2010