Musab Omar Ali Al Mudwani

Musab Omar Ali al Madoonee
Born	1980 (age 43–44) Al-Hudida, Yemen
Other names	Musab Omar Ali al Mudwani Musab Omarali al Mudwani

Musab Omar Ali al Madoonee is a citizen of Yemen held in extrajudicial detention in the United States Guantanamo Bay detainment camps, in Cuba. His Guantanamo Internment Serial Number is 839. Joint Task Force Guantanamo counter-terrorism analysts estimate Al Madoonee was born in 1980, Al-Hudida, Yemen.

Madwani was captured in Karachi, Pakistan with five other men, dubbed the "Karachi Six", on the symbolic date of September 11, 2002. He spent a month and a half in a CIA black site near Kabul.

Madwani arrived at Guantanamo on October 28, 2002, and has been held at Guantanamo for Template:For year month day.

Official status reviews

Originally the Bush Presidency asserted that captives apprehended in the "war on terror" were not covered by the Geneva Conventions, and could be held indefinitely, without charge, and without an open and transparent review of the justifications for their detention. In 2004 the United States Supreme Court ruled, in Rasul v. Bush, that Guantanamo captives were entitled to being informed of the allegations justifying their detention, and were entitled to try to refute them.

Office for the Administrative Review of Detained Enemy Combatants

Combatant Status Review Tribunals were held in a 3x5 meter trailer where the captive sat with his hands and feet shackled to a bolt in the floor.

Following the Supreme Court's ruling the Department of Defense set up the Office for the Administrative Review of Detained Enemy Combatants.

Scholars at the Brookings Institute, lead by Benjamin Wittes, listed the captives still held in Guantanamo in December 2008, according to whether their detention was justified by certain common allegations:

• Musab Omar Ali Al Mudwani was listed as one of the captives who "The military alleges ... are members of Al Qaeda."
• Musab Omar Ali Al Mudwani was listed as one of the captives who "The military alleges ... traveled to Afghanistan for jihad."
• Musab Omar Ali Al Mudwani was listed as one of the captives who "The military alleges that the following detainees stayed in Al Qaeda, Taliban or other guest- or safehouses."
• Musab Omar Ali Al Mudwani was listed as one of the captives who "The military alleges ... took military or terrorist training in Afghanistan."
• Musab Omar Ali Al Mudwani was listed as one of the captives who "The military alleges that the following detainees were captured under circumstances that strongly suggest belligerency."
• Musab Omar Ali Al Mudwani was listed as one of the captives who was an "al Qaeda operative".
• Musab Omar Ali Al Mudwani was listed as one of the captives who "deny affiliation with Al Qaeda or the Taliban yet admit facts that, under the broad authority the laws of war give armed parties to detain the enemy, offer the government ample legal justification for its detention decisions."
• Musab Omar Ali Al Mudwani was listed as one of the captives who had admitted "fighting on behalf of Al Qaeda or the Taliban."

Formerly secret Joint Task Force Guantanamo assessment

On April 25, 2011, whistleblower organization WikiLeaks published formerly secret assessments drafted by Joint Task Force Guantanamo analysts. His eleven-page Joint Task Force Guantanamo assessment was drafted on .June 20, 2008. It was signed by camp commandant Rear Admiral David M. Thomas Jr.. He recommended continued detention.

Al Madoonee participated in his Combatant Status Review Tribunal.

Allegations

The allegations against Al Madoonee were:

a The detainee is an Al Qaeda fighter:

1. In July 2001, Al Mudwani was recruited by two men, who identified themselves as former mujahid, to go to Afghanistan and train to fight.
2. The detainee stated that he stayed at the Daftar Al-Taliban guesthouse for four hours, prior to going to Kandahar, where he stayed at the Madafat Al-Nibras guesthouse where he was fed and given new clothes.
3. The detainee stated that after seven (7) days at the guesthouse in Kandahar, he traveled to the Al Farouq training camp, a known Taliban training camp.
4. The detainee stated that he received training on the Kalahnikov rifle, pistol BEKA, RPG, and the Magnoona. The detainee stated the he only trained for twenty-five (25) days because the camp closed due to the U.S. bombing campaign.
5. The detainee stated that he saw Usama Bin Laden (UBL) several times and at various training facilities during his time in Afghanistan and last saw Bin Laden in Khowst about a month before the fall of Kabul.

b The detainee participated in military operations against the coalition.

1. The detainee stated that he left Al-Farouq on a military bus with twenty-five (25) other students from Al-Farouq and went to Kabul.
2. The detainee stated that he went to Kabul, and three days after his arrival Kabul fell.
3. After the fall of Kabul, the detainee went to Pakistan where he was captured by the Pakistani police, after a shootout, on September 11, 2002.

Administrative Review Board hearings

Hearing room where Guantanamo captive's annual Administrative Review Board hearings convened for captives whose Combatant Status Review Tribunal had already determined they were an "enemy combatant".

Detainees who were determined to have been properly classified as "enemy combatants" were scheduled to have their dossier reviewed at annual Administrative Review Board hearings. The Administrative Review Boards weren't authorized to review whether a detainee qualified for POW status, and they weren't authorized to review whether a detainee should have been classified as an "enemy combatant".

They were authorized to consider whether a detainee should continue to be detained by the United States because he continued to pose a threat, whether they could safely be repatriated to the custody of their home country, or whether they could be set free.

2005 Administrative Review Board hearing

A three page Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Musab Omar Ali Al Mudwani's first annual Administrative Review Board hearing on November 19, 2005. The memo listed 16 primary factors that favored continued detention and 4 primary factors that favored transfer or release.

The following primary factors favor continued detention

a. Commitment

1. The detainee was recruited to go to Afghanistan in his hometown of Al-Hudaida.
2. The detainee said he wanted the opportunity to train in Afghanistan because it was his duty as a Muslim to be trained. He had no intentions of fighting in Afghanistan.
3. The detainee left for Pakistan at the end of July 2001. He traveled to Karachi and stayed at the Dubai hotel and the Madafat Riyad guesthouse. The detainee then traveled to Quetta where he stayed at the Daftar al Taliban guesthouse. From there he went to Kandahar and stayed at the Madafat al Nibras.
4. The detainee stayed at a school, where a senior al Qaida operative was working, in the vicinity of Bermal, Afghanistan when he was fleeing Afghanistan.
5. From Kabul, Afghanistan, the detainee fled to Zurmat. He then crossed over the border and went to Lahore Pakistan.
6. The detainee then left Lahore and went to Karachi, Pakistan, where he was hidden in several places. When things got dangerous in Karachi, he was told to go to Chabehar, Iran.
7. While [the] detainee was attempting to travel to Yemen via Chabahar, Iran he and his travel companion were detained, questioned and released by Iranian polce at a roadside checkpoint located on the main road to Chabahar from Zahedan, Iran.
8. While at the Iranian checkpoint, the detainee claims he was beaten and questioned. The Iranian police officers attempted to speak to [the] detainee in several languages. The detainee claimed he did not speak throughout the encounter with the Iranian police because he had been given instructions at the start of his journey to not reveal that he was an Arab.
9. The detainee went back to Quetta, Pakistan with eight other Arabs and then went to Lahore. He stayed one month in Lahore, Pakistan.
10. The detainee stated he attended a religious speech to al Qaida operatives.
11. The detainee was identified as an al Qaida member.

b. Training

1. The detainee then traveled to the al Farouq training camp. He stayed at a reception tent that was located about 50 meters from the actual camp for five days before starting training with his group. He received training on the Kalashnikov, pistol, Beka, RPG and the Magnoona. The detainee only trained for 25 days because the camp was closed due to United States bombing.
2. All the trainees in the al Farouq camp were told to go home because it was not safe there due to the September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States. On approximately 13 September 2001, trainees were transported to the al Nibras guesthouse in Kandahar, Afghanistan.
3. An identified al Qaida member claimed the detainee took part in explosives training.

c. Connections/Associations

1. the detainee said he saw Usama Bin Laden at several lectures.

d. Other relevant data

1. The detainee was arrested at the apartments in Karachi's defense II commercial area where a two and one half hour firefight between Arabs and Pakistani security forces ensued. Two handguns and three Russian style grenades were. recovered from the scene. A Kalashnikov rifle and a submachine gun used by the Arabs were also seized by police officials.
2. The detainee stated the weapons were kept in a small suitcase in a common room. Also in the room were some computer equipment and other things kept behind a curtain.
3. A computer was recovered in the safe houses where the detainee was arrested. The computer contained information on flight navigation maps and flight simulators.
4. The computer recovered during the detainee's arrest contained a manual that discussed kidnapping, hijacking, smuggling various things into countries of states and al Qaida documents about artillery and different types of mortars.

The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. According to the detainee he never used the computer and did not know what was on it.

b. The detainee stated he had no information regarding imminent terrorist attacks worldwide.

c. The detainee emphatically denied he trained on explosives. He insisted that whoever claimed that he had explosives training is either lying or mistook his identity.

d. The detainee expressed some anger about Sheiks who issue fatwas, then recant. The detainee said that clerics make you believe you will burn in hell if you do not participate in fatwas or jihad.

Transcript

Al Madoonee chose to participate in his Administrative Review Board hearing. The Department of Defense published a 13 summarized transcript from the hearing in September2007.

Enemy Combatant Election Form

Musab Omar Ali Al Madoonee's Assisting Military Officer read from his notes on the Enemy Combatant Election Form from pre-hearing interviews on December 12, 2005, and December 13, 2005. The Department of Defense published a 13 summarized transcript from the hearing in September2007.

The interviews lasted 138 minutes and 30 minutes. Musab Omar Ali Al Mudwani's copy of the Summary of Evidence memo was translated into Arabic.

His Assisting Military Officer described Musab Omar Ali Al Madoonee as "...cooperative and calm throughout both interviews.".

2006 Administrative Review Board hearing

A four page Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Musab Omar Ali Al Mudwani's second annual Administrative Review Board hearing on November 9, 2006. The memo listed 23 primary factors that favored continued detention and 7 primary factors that favored transfer or release.

2007 Administrative Review Board hearing

A three page Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Musab Omar Ali Al Mudwani's third annual Administrative Review Board hearing on December 19, 2007. The memo listed 13 primary factors that favored continued detention and 6 primary factors that favored transfer or release.

External links

• “Model Prisoner” at Guantánamo, Tortured in the “Dark Prison,” Loses Habeas Corpus Petition Andy Worthington 15.12.09