Metaphysics in the Enneads

Metaphysics or ontogenesis in the Enneads of Plotinus

Chapters on ontogenesis

Chapters on ontogenesis as listed in Mazur (2021), with chapter and treatise descriptions from Gerson (2018):

• 2.4: On Matter
  • Chapter 5: Those who declare matter to be substantial are correct in a way. For intelligible matter may be considered to be substantial insofar as it is illuminated and possesses intellectual life. Intelligible matter is eternal but generated.
• 3.8: On Nature, Contemplation, and the One
  • Chapter 8: In Intellect contemplation is identical with the object of contemplation. It is the primary life and all life at every level is contemplative.
  • Chapter 11: Intellect needs the Good, but the Good is not in need of anything.
• 5.1-5
  • 5.1: On the Three Primary Hypostases
    • Chapter 6: How the One produces Intellect without itself changing. How Intellect reverts to the One and in so doing thinks all intelligibles and generates Soul.
    • Chapter 7: Intellect is like the One but not vice versa. The complete transcendence of the One. The generation of Soul by Intellect is the last generation within intelligible reality.
  • 5.2: On the Generation and Order of the Things Which Come after the First
    • Chapter 1: The One is all things and no thing. How Intellect comes from the One and Soul from Intellect. How from Soul come individual souls including the lowest types of souls, those of plants.
  • 5.3: On the Knowing Hypostasis and on That Which Is Transcendent
    • Chapter 11: How Intellect tries to cognize the One but can necessarily only cognize a multiplicity of its images, namely, all intelligibles.
  • 5.4: How That Which Is after the First Comes from the First, and on the One
    • Chapter 2: The derivation of Intellect from the One and the distinction between internal and external activity. In what sense Intellect is identical with the Indefinite Dyad and in what sense it is identical with all Being.
  • 5.5: That the Intelligibles Are Not outside the Intellect, and on the Good
    • Chapter 5: The One is productive of all things. It produces Intellect first. The One is not participated in.
  • 5.6: On the Fact That That Which Transcends Being Does Not Think and on What the Primary Thinking Is and What Is Secondary
    • Chapter 5: The Good does think because thinking is always of that which is distinct from the thinker and thinking is always of the Good. The Good cannot be distinct from itself.
• 6.7-8
  • 6.7: How the Multiplicity of the Ideas Came to Exist, and on the Good
    • Chapter 16: Intellect does not see the Good, it lives in accordance with it, hence the Good explains the Forms, Substance, and their being seen.
    • Chapter 17: Intellect acquires boundaries on having seen the Good, hence the Forms are in Intellect, and are themselves intellects. Intellect makes Soul rational by passing on a trace of what it itself receives from the Good.
  • 6.8: On the Voluntary, and the One’s Wishing
    • Chapter 16: The positive attributes of the Good.
    • Chapter 18: We should look for the Good in ourselves; images of the Good.

Porphyry's chronological arrangement of the treatises listed above are as follows.

Order	Ennead
7	5.4
10	5.1
11	5.2
12	2.4
24	5.6
30	3.8
32	5.5
38	6.7
39	6.8
49	5.3

Excerpts: Ontogensis

V.4.2.1–26

[B1] V.4[7].2.1–26 (text H-S¹)

Gerson (2018)

Mazur (2021)

And so if the generator was Intellect, it would be more deficient than Intellect but would need to be more attentive to Intellect and be similar to it; but since the generator is beyond Intellect, it is necessarily Intellect. But why is it not Intellect, whose activity is intellection? Intellection, seeing the intelligible and turning towards that one and, as it were, being completed and perfected by that one, is itself, on the one hand, indefinite like sight, but is defined by the intelligible. For this reason, also it is said that from the Indefinite Dyad and the One come the Forms and numbers: for this is Intellect. Therefore it is not simple, but multiple, and manifests composition, indeed an intelligible one, and one immediately seeing many things. And so it is also itself an intelligible, but is also intelligizing; therefore it is already two. It is also another intelligible by being after it. But how does this Intellect derive from the Intelligible? The Intelligible remains by itself and is not deficient like that which sees and intelligizes— I deem that which intelligizes deficient with respect to that one—it is not without sensation, but all things belong to it and are in it and with it; it is entirely able to discern itself; life is in it and all things are in it and it is its own self— consideration, and exists as if by consciousness in everlasting rest, and intelligizes in a manner different from the intellection according to Intellect…. Since, therefore that one remains intelligible, that which comes into being becomes intellection, as it is intellection and is intelligizing that from which it came to be—for it has nothing else—it becomes Intellect, [that is,] another (as it were) “Intelligible,” and like that one and an imitation and image of it.

If, then, Intellect itself were doing the generating, that which is generated must be inferior to Intellect, though as close as possible to Intellect and the same as it. But since that which generates transcends Intellect, that which is generated is necessarily Intellect. Why is that which generates not Intellect, the activity of which is intellection? But intellection sees the intelligible and turns towards it and is in a way perfected by this; it is itself indefinite like sight, and made definite by the intelligible. For this reason, it is said that ‘from the Indefinite Dyad and from the One’ come the Forms or Numbers. For this is Intellect. For this reason, Intellect is not simple, but multiple, revealing itself as a composite, although an intelligible one, and consequently seeing many things. It is, then, itself intelligible, but also thinking. For this reason, it is already two. But it is also an intelligible other than the One due to the fact that it comes after the One. But how does this Intellect come from that which is intelligible? The intelligible, remaining in itself and not lacking anything, as does that which sees and that which thinks – I mean by ‘lacking’ the state of what thinks in respect of the intelligible – it is not in a way unperceiving; rather, all things that belong to it are in it, and with it. It is in every way self-discerning; its life is in itself and everything is in itself; and its grasping of itself is itself – a grasping that is as if by self-awareness in a state of eternal stability, or by an act of intellection that is different from the intellection of Intellect. If, then, something comes to be while it remains in itself, this thing comes to be from it when it is most of all what it is. While it remains, then, ‘in its own customary state’, that which comes to be comes to be from it, but comes to be while it remains. Since, then, it remains intelligible, that which comes to be is intellection. And since it is intellection, and intellection of that from which it came – for there is nothing else – it is Intellect, in a way a second intelligible and in a way a second One; an imitation and image of the One.

V.1.6.15–19

[B2] V.1[10].6.15–19 (text H-S¹)

Gerson (2018)	Mazur (2021)
For everything that is moved, there must be something towards which it is moved. Since there is no such thing for that one, let us not posit that it is moved, but if anything comes to be after it, it must come to be while that one is eternally reverted towards it(self).	It must be that for everything in motion there is something towards which it moves. Since the One has nothing towards which it moves, let us not suppose that it is moving. But if something comes to be after it, it has necessarily come to be by being eternally turned towards it [the One].

V.1.7.1–6

[B3] V.1[10].7.1–6 (text H-S¹)

Gerson (2018)

Mazur (2021)

We say that the Intellect is an image of that one, for it is necessary to speak more clearly. First, it is necessary for what has come to be, to somehow be that one, and to preserve much of it, and to be most closely similar to it just as is light of the sun. But that is not Intellect. And so how does it generate Intellect? Because with its reversion to it(self), it was seeing, and this seeing is itself Intellect.

We are saying that Intellect is an image of the One, first – for we should express ourselves more clearly – because that which is produced must somehow be the One and preserve many of its properties, that is, be the same as it, just like the light that comes from the sun. But the One is not Intellect. How, then, does it generate Intellect? In fact, by its reversion to it, Intellect saw the One, and this seeing is Intellect.

V.2.1.7–13

[B4] V.2[11].1.7–13 (text H-S¹)

Gerson (2018)

Mazur (2021)

And this is, as it were, the first birth: for being perfect (as it seeks nothing, has nothing, and needs nothing), it (as it were) overflows, and its overflow has made another. This, having come into being, reverts towards it and is filled; and by looking towards it, this becomes Intellect as well. And its standing towards that one makes Being, while its looking towards it is Intellect. So since it stands towards it so that it should see, it becomes simultaneously Intellect and Being.

Indeed, this is, in a way, the first act of generation. Since it is perfect, due to its neither seeking anything, nor having anything, nor needing anything, it in a way overflows and its superabundance has made something else. That which was generated reverted to it and was filled up and became what it is by looking at it, and this is Intellect. The positioning of it in relation to the One produced Being; its gazing upon the One produced Intellect. Since, then, it positions itself in relation to the One in order that it may see, it becomes Intellect and Being at the same time.

II.4.5.28–39

[B5] II.4[12].5.28–39 (text H-S¹)

Gerson (2018)

Mazur (2021)

For indeed the otherness there always exists, i.e., that [otherness] which makes matter; for this is the principle of matter, and the first motion. Thus also it [i.e., motion] is called otherness, because motion and otherness sprouted forth simultaneously. The motion and otherness which are from the First are indefinite, and need that one so as to be defined. It is defined when it reverts towards it, but beforehand both matter and the other are indefinite and not yet good, but are unilluminated by that one. For if light is from that one, the one receiving the light, prior to the receiving, always does not have light, but has it as another, since the light is from another.

For the Difference in the intelligible world that produces thematter exists always. For this is the principle of matter, this and the first Motion. For this reason, Motion has been said to be Difference, since Motion and Difference were engendered together. The Motion and Difference that are proceeding from the first are indefinite, and they require the first to be made definite, and they are made definite when they have reverted to it. And matter, too, is previously indefinite insofar as it is different and not yet good and still unilluminated by the first. For if the light derives from the first, then what receives this light, prior to having received it, had always been without light, and it has light as something other than itself, if indeed the light derives from another.

V.6.5.5–10

[B6] V.6[24].5.5–10 (text H-S¹, modified)

Gerson (2018)

Mazur (2021)

For thinking is first neither with respect to being nor to honor, but is second and what has come into being while the Good subsisted and moved what has come into being to itself: it was moved and saw. And this is thinking: a movement towards good, desiring that one, for desire generates intellection and consubstantiates it with itself; for desire of sight is seeing.

For thinking is not first, neither by being first nor by being more honourable, but it is second and has come to be when the Good, which already existed, moved that which had come to be to itself, which then was moved and saw it. And this is intellection: motion towards the Good that it desires. For the desire generated the intellection and caused it to exist with itself. For desire for seeing is sight.

III.8.8.31–38

[B7] III.8[30].8.31–38 (text H-S¹)

Gerson (2018)

Mazur (2021)

Since also when it contemplates the One [or: when the One contemplates] it is not as one; if not, it would not become Intellect. But beginning as one, it did not remain as it began, but unaware of itself, became multiple, as it were, weighted down, and unravelled itself wanting to have everything—as it was better for it not to have wanted this, [for] it became the second—like a circle unravelling itself it became shape and surface and circumference and center—point and lines, both those above and those below.

Since even when it contemplates the One, it does so not as one. If this were not so, it would not become Intellect. But beginning as one, it did not remain as it began, but, becoming many without noticing it, in a way ‘weighed down’ it unfolded itself in its wish to have everything – how much better it would have been for it not to want this, for it became second – as a circle comes to be by deploying itself; shape, plane, circumference, centre, radii, some parts above, others below.

III.8.11.1–7

[B8] III.8[30].11.1–7 (text H-S¹)

Gerson (2018)

Mazur (2021)

Since Intellect is a sight and a seeing sight, it will be a power having come into actuality. Therefore there will be on the one hand its matter, and on the other, its form (but the matter is [also] in the intelligible). Since also seeing in actuality has duality, it was indeed one before seeing. And so the one has become two and the two one. For the seeing, the filling [or impregnation] and, as it were, perfecting, comes from the perceptible object, but for the sight of Intellect the Good is what fills [or impregnates] it.

Since Intellect is a kind of sight and a sight that is seeing, it will be [like] a potency which is actualized. So, there will be its matter and its form, thoughmatter here is intelligible. Besides, actual seeing, too, is twofold; before seeing it was one; then, the one became two and the two one. The completion and, in a way, perfecting of sight, then, comes from the sensible, but for the sight of Intellect it is the Good which completes it.

V.5.5.16–19

[B9] V.5[32].5.16–19 (text H-S¹)

Gerson (2018)	Mazur (2021)
This that is said to be primary Being, proceeding, as it were, a little ways from there, did not wish to come forth anymore, but having turned towards its interior, stood, and became the substance and hearth of all things.	For that which is said to ‘be’ first proceeded a little from the One, in a way, and did not want to go still further, but turned within itself and stood there [este], and became Substance, the ‘hearth’ [hestia] of all things.

VI.7.16.10–35

[B10] VI.7[38].16.10–35 (text H-S¹)

Gerson (2018)

Mazur (2021)

Did it, when it was looking towards the Good, think that one as many, and he himself “One—Being,” think him as many, dividing him in himself by not being able to think the whole at once? But it was not yet Intellect while it was looking at that, but looked unintellectually. Or we should say that it was not ever looking, but lived towards it and depended upon it and turned towards it; indeed its very motion was filled by its being moved there, and it filled it around that, and it was not still motion alone, but motion satiated and full; and thereafter it became all things and knew this in its consciousness of itself and was already Intellect, having been filled so that it should have what it sees, but looking at these things with light from the provider and receiving this. Because of this it is not only said to be the cause of substance but of its being seen. And just as the sun, which is cause for sense—objects both of their being seen and their coming into being, is also in some way cause of sight—and therefore is neither sight nor the things which have come to be—in this way also the nature of the Good, which is the cause of substance and intellect and light, according to our analogy, to the things seen there and the seer, is neither the real beings nor intellect but cause of these, giving by its own light thinking and being thought to the real beings and to intellect. So then it came to be by being filled, and when it was filled it was, and simultaneously it was perfected and was seeing. Its principle was that which it was before being filled, but another principle, in a way external to it, was the one that filled it, from which it, as it were, was ‘imprinted’ as it was being filled.

Did Intellect, when it was looking towards the Good, conceive of that One as a many and, being one itself, conceive of the Good as a many, in portioning up the Good, because it was not capable of thinking it whole all together? But looking at the Good it was not yet Intellect; it looked nonintellectually. In fact, we should assert that Intellect was never seeing the Good; rather, it was living relative to it; it was dependent on it, and was turned towards it. The motion itself was actually fulfilled by being motion in the intelligible world, and it was fulfilled in relation to the Good itself; it was no longer mere motion, but satiated and full motion. Intellect next became all things and knew this in its self-awareness; and now it was Intellect, having been fulfilled, so that it possessed what it saw; it looks on them with light, since it is provided both with them and the light by the bestower of them. Because of this the Good is said to be the cause not only of the Substance but also of the substance being seen; just as the sun, in being the cause of sensible things being seen and coming to be, and so of seeing in a way, too – and so it is neither seeing nor the things coming to be – so, too, the nature of the Good, being the cause of Substance and Intellect is light, according to the analogy, for the visible things in the intelligible world and the seeing things there, although it is neither Beings not Intellect, but is the cause of them, and, with its light, makes possible thinking and being thought for Beings and Intellect. Intellect came into being by being fulfilled, and fulfilled it was, and brought all things to completion together and saw it. Its principle was before Intellect was fulfilled; it is another principle which, in a way, from outside fulfilled it, and which stamped it with its mark in fulfilling it.

VI.7.17.12–26

[B11] VI.7[38].17.12–26 (text H-S¹, modified)

Gerson (2018)

Mazur (2021)

It, therefore, had life and had no need of a multifarious giver, and its life was some trace of that and not its life. And so looking towards that one, it was unlimited, but having looked there, it was limited, that one having no limit. For immediately by looking towards some “one,” the life is bounded by it, and has in itself boundary and limit and form; and the form was in that which was shaped, but the shaper was amorphous. But the boundary is not from outside, as if surrounded by magnitude, but it was the boundary of all that life which is manifold and unlimited, as one would be shining out from such a nature. And it was not the life of a particular thing; for it would already be limited to that of an individual; nevertheless, it was defined; it was therefore defined as the life of some “One—Many”—and each of the many was at that point defined—and it was defined, on the one hand, as “Many” through the multiplicity of the life, yet again, on the other hand, as “One,” through the boundary. So what is “defined as one”? Intellect. For life defined is Intellect.

So, Intellect had Life, and was in no need of a variegated giver. Life was a kind of trace of the Good, not the Life of the Good. Life, then, while it was looking to the Good, was indefinite, but once it had looked, it was bounded in the intelligible world, although the Good has no boundary. For straightaway on having looked towards something one it is bounded by it, and has in itself boundary, limit, and form. And the form is in the thing shaped, while the thing that shapes is without shape. The boundary was not external, as though it had been set around amagnitude, but was a boundary belonging to all that life, which was itself multiple and unlimited, because it shines out of such a great nature. And it was not life of just something, for then it would have been, as belonging to an individual, bounded already. But, nonetheless, bounded it was; it was, therefore, the bounded life of a ‘one-many’ – and indeed each of the many was also bounded – and while it was bounded as many, because of the multitude of its life, it was still one because of its boundary. What, then, does it mean to say ‘life was bounded as one’? That it is Intellect, for bounded Life is Intellect.

VI.8.16.12–30

[B12] VI.8[39].16.12–30 (text H-S¹)

Gerson (2018)

Mazur (2021)

He is, as it were, borne into his own interior, as it were, loving himself, the “pure ray,” being himself that which he loves; that is, he substantiates himself, since he is an abiding activity and the most loveable thing like Intellect. Intellect is an actualization; thus he is an actualization. But not of anything else; he is, perhaps, an actualization of himself. Not, as it seems, as he is accidentally, but as he acts. Still, furthermore, if he is most of all, because he (as it were) establishes himself and, as it were, looks to himself, and this (as it were) “Being” for him is his looking to himself, he would as it were make himself not as he happened to be but as he himself wishes, and the willing is not random nor accidental, for being the willing of the best, it is not random. That such an inclination of his towards himself—being, as it were, his activity and remaining in itself—makes him be what he is, is evinced by hypothetically postulating the opposite: that if he inclined towards his exterior, it would destroy his being what he is; therefore, to be what he is, is an activity towards himself; this is one and himself. He then substantiated himself, his activity having been brought out together after him.

It is borne in a way inside itself, as though loving itself, in the pure radiance, being itself that which it loved, that is, it has made itself exist, if indeed it is persisting activity and the most loved thing, like Intellect. But Intellect is the result of actuality; hence, the Good is that, too, but not of anything else. It is, therefore, the result of its own activity. It is, therefore, not as it is accidentally; rather, it is as it itself acts. So, furthermore, if it exists most of all, because it fixes itself relative to itself, and in a way regards itself, and this being for itself, in a way, is its self-regard, as though it would produce itself, then it is not as chance would have it, but the way it wants to be, nor is its wishing random, nor accidentally as it is. For because its wishing is of the best, it is not random. But that this sort of inclination towards itself, being in a way an activity of itself, and a persistence in itself, produces what it is, is testified to by supposing the opposite. If its inclination were towards that which is outside itself, it would destroy what it is. Being, therefore, just what it is, it is activity relative to itself. This is one thing, namely, itself. It, therefore, brings itself into existence, because its activity is brought about along with it.

VI.8.18.18–30

[B13] VI.8[39].18.18–30 (text H-S¹)

Gerson (2018)

Mazur (2021)

Thus one must grasp both Intellect and Being: coming to be from that one, as it were, poured out and unraveled and hanging out, it attests from its intellectual nature the (as it were) ‘Intellect’ in the One that is not Intellect; for it is one. Just as there [in the geometrical analogy], neither the radii nor the circle are the center, but the [the center] is the father of the circle, giving traces of itself and by means of abiding power having generated the radii and the circle by means of some strength, not at all divided off from him; thus also that too, while an intellectual power is running around it, is, as it were, an archetype of his image, the Intellect in One, as it were defeated by and into many, and by means of these things becoming Intellect, as he remains before Intellect, generating Intellect <from> its power.

In this way, one should grasp that Intellect, that is, Being, which comes about from the Good, and is, in a way, poured out, and developed from it and depends on it, gives evidence by its intelligent nature of a sort of intellect in the One although this [One] is not Intellect, for it is one. Just as in the case of the circle, the centre is neither lines nor circle, but is the father of lines and circle, by giving traces of itself, and produces lines and circle with a persisting power; they come about from a kind of strength without being cut off from it at all. So, too, with the Good; it serves as the archetype of the image of itself, when the intellectual power is running around it, whereas Intellect comes about by being overcome by the many, and turning into the many Beings. The Good persists all the while its power generates Intellect.

V.3.11.1–16

[B14] V.3[49].11.1–16 (text H-S¹, modified)

Gerson (2018)

Mazur (2021)

Thus this multiple Intellect, when it wishes to think the Transcendent (that one itself [being] one), but wishing to blossom as if simple, it comes out eternally grasping another, multiplied in itself; so that it moved to it not as Intellect, but as vision not yet seeing, and came out having that which the vision multiplied. For again it has the impression of the thing seen, or else it would not have allowed it to come to be in itself. This became many out of one, and thus coming to know it saw it, and then became seeing sight. It is already Intellect when it has this, and has it as Intellect; but before this, it is only desire and unimprinted sight. And so this Intellect apprehended that one, but grasping it became Intellect, eternally in need and having become Intellect, substance, and thought, when it thought; for before this it was not thinking, not having the intelligible nor Intellect, not having yet thought.

For this reason, this Intellect, which is multiple, whenever it wants to think that which is transcendent, thinks it as one, but, wanting to attain it in its simplicity, ends up always grasping something else pluralized in itself. As a result, it impelled itself towards it not as Intellect, but as sight that is not yet seeing, and when it stopped, it possessed what it itself had pluralized, so that whereas it longed for something else having in an undefined way something like a semblance, when it stopped it grasped something else in itself, making it multiple. For, in addition, it has an impression of that which is seen; otherwise, it would not have permitted it to come to be in itself. But this became a multiple from a one, and in this way, in cognizing it, it knew itself, and then it became sight that sees. This is already Intellect when it has it, and it has it as Intellect. Prior to this, it was only desire and a sight that is without an impression.

See also

• Mysticism in the Enneads

References

• Mazur, Zeke (2021). The Platonizing Sethian background of Plotinus's mysticism. Leiden: Brill. ISBN 978-90-04-44171-2.
• Gerson, Lloyd P. (trans.) (2018). The Enneads. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-1-107-00177-0.

Greek sources

Both Mazur (2021) and Gerson (2018) are based on the Henry-Schwyzer Greek texts (i.e., edited by Paul Henry and Hans-Rudolph Schwyzer).

• Mazur (2021) is based on the editio maior (HS¹).
  • Addenda to HS¹ are labelled HS³.
• Gerson (2018) primarily uses the editio minor (HS²), but also makes some textual changes.
  • Textual addenda to HS² are labelled HS⁴.

The Henry-Schwyzer Greek texts are:

• Henry, Paul, and Hans-Rudolf Schwyzer. Plotini Opera. (Editio maior in 3 vols.). Bruxelles and Paris: Museum Lessianum, 1951-1973.
• Henry, Paul, and Hans-Rudolf Schwyzer. Plotini Opera. (Editio minor in 3 vols.). Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964-1982.